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Widening roads to ease congestion is like trying to cure obesity by loosening your belt. 
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Freeways have had a strong influence not only on the urban transportation but 
also on downtown areas both physically and socially. Certainly, they have extended the 
commuting limits of the city and made lower land costs more accessible. However, many 
of the mid-century freeways, once championed by planners as tools for urban renewal, 
have created swaths of blight through city neighborhoods. Their negative impacts on the 
larger urban framework requires new ideas for healthier alternatives to aid in preserving 
and building sustainable cities. 
Removal of any downtown highway requires careful thought— even more 
consideration than when it was built.  Quick solutions are what resulted in the problems 
that downtown highways of the Interstate-Era have  today. If it is the simple interactions 
between people and place are that make up the positive aspects an urban environment, 
then what are the possibilities and strategies for removing urban highway, which are one 
of the primary impediments separating people in place in contemporary cities? This 
question is the focus of this thesis. 
At its core, the removal of freeways represents a trade-off between mobility 
objectives and economic development objectives. Evidence from other cities’ decisions 
to redesign or remove their downtown highways suggests multiple benefits. Making 
design changes, such as to replace a downtown highway with a well-designed surface 
boulevard, can stimulate economic activities without necessarily causing traffic chaos.  
Solutions come in different shapes and sizes. The selected case studies in this 
thesis reflect a diversity of approaches – suggesting no single strategy exists for 
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addressing downtown highway issues. This reflects the fact that multiple alternatives 
must be considered in every situation because each approach varies in costs and 
opportunities. A typology of highway alternations derived from the case studies includes 
seven different techniques: burying, demolishing, taming, capping or bridging, elevating, 
retaining, and relocating. The final chapter applies the conclusions from the case studies 
to the Downtown Connector– Interstate 75/85– in Downtown Atlanta, Georgia.  
  Urban design and transportation planning has an emerging new set of values. 
Transportation planning is  seeking to promote alternate modes of transportation to the 
private vehicle, like transit, by foot, or by bicycle. We now understand that connectivity 
is not served only by highways but also by urban street networks that invite modes other 
than just automobiles. An important role for urban design will be to shape the way these 









1.1 Planning for the automobile 
Between the years of 1918 and 1925, vehicle registration in the United States 
jumped from 6.2 million to 20.1 million [1]. The growth in the number of automobiles 
certainly had a power to shape the nation, and the nation was proud. Nevertheless, urban 
areas were experiencing such an increase in congestion. Road infrastructure was not 
equipped to handle the new demands. Thus, planners realized that, with current traffic 
data, new strategies must be set in place. Consultants prepared documents titled major 
traffic street plans for cities like Los Angeles, California and Portland, Oregon [2]. 
Leader of these cities’ downtown businesses were major antagonists for these plans. They 
believed congestion was driving customers away from the central business district and to 
the suburbs [2]. A decline in customers meant a drop in these property values.  
Because major traffic street plans were driven by the concerns of businesses, they 
focused on improving traffic patterns that would allow for easier, quicker access. 
Proposed street systems began by highlighting which roads would have predicted high 
capacities of vehicles. Improving connectivity was the focus for these roads. 
Enhancement of infrastructure meant widening lanes, straightening out their forms, 




Figure 1.1: Major Traffic Street Plan for Los Angeles, 1924 [3] 
The plans proposed a new classification system for downtown streets. Varying 
speed limits and road widths were to help guide traffic by use [2]. The different modes of 
transportation initially had separation. Authors of these plans began to lead toward a 
better coordination of transportation with land use [2]. Rights of way eventually became a 
priority over new developments [2]. Funding primarily came from property tax revenues. 
Citizens who understood these infrastructure changes were necessary for congestion 
relief financed further needs. Support was led by businesses in and around town, driving 
clubs, and real estate interests [3]. 
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Grade separation proposed a design that echoed the future of high traffic. It was 
designed to allow for higher speeds, higher capacity, and direct links to certain parts of 
the city [3]. Just as the central business district became more readily accessed, these areas 
were just as easy to leave when the day was over. These changes were only furthered by 
the next major transportation system proposal.  
1.2 The Lifespan of the Downtown Highway 
  From 1925-1929, again vehicle registration increased another thirty percent [1]. 
Major traffic street plans did not take into consideration a change so soon after. Surface 
streets and their rationalized geometry were no longer the solution. Planners like Harland 
Bartholomew designed what was thought to be final and permanent [2]. This new 
proposal pointed to a new classification for a roadway that allowed for seemingly 
unimaginable capacities, speeds, and convenience for private vehicle transportation in 
cities [2]. Named the freeway, speedway, expressway— the highway was in the works.  
 Highway design looked at rural and suburban parkways and characterized itself 
similarly by using two points [4]. First, grade separation brought with it safety [4]. It 
minimized disruption from crossing routes, effectively reducing collisions at 
intersections. Second, limited access helped prevent unpredictability from outside traffic 
[4]. Essentially both tools allowed for high capacity, high speeds, and fewer collisions.  
 Designs of the urban fabric took shape through their highways. Highway design 
initially considered how it would interact in its surroundings, flowing with the local and 
greater transportation networks [3]. The highway was just a part of the urban organism 
and not meant to be the controller. The idea of its footprint was kept subtle with two or 
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three lanes of traffic, and speeds of forty or fifty miles per hour [3]. Access points were to 
be created sparingly and shaped individually, to avoid disrupting the urban fabric [3].  
 The downtown highway was to be laid out in a dense network. The freeways 
would be smaller and more plentiful [3]. Traffic would be less concentrated in one area 
and vehicles could travel less distances in the downtown region to find access [3]. In 
contrast, many of today’s downtown highways are sparse, in a ring/radial system. 
 
Figure 1.2: Freeways for the central part of Los Angeles, 1939 [3] 
Transit had a place in many of these plans, sometimes along the median of these 
highways. Urban growth with these tools had planners believing in urban renewal and a 
slowing of suburban sprawl [2]. Looking back from the present, these leaders of planning 
just may have made a better outcome than the situation found today in so many cities 
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throughout the United States [4]. They had a strong belief that this system could bring 
great benefits, or great disruption if not followed properly [2]. 
Planners Facing Engineers 
Early downtown highway design took into account factors that were short lived 
due to their soaring costs. As cities failed to come up with proper funding, they looked to 
other cities services, their state, and finally the federal government for help. Due to these 
ambitious proposals, urban planners lost the control to design this transportation network 
[5]. 
Due to the Great Depression and its issues with plummeting property values, 
cities lost funding, often revenue from property tax, and thus a change in funding was in 
order. Vehicle demand was still rising. The federal government issued a gasoline tax [5]. 
This shifted where the financing and the power of authority to design the highways would 
come from.  
Depression-era highway building was initiated to help farmers, to increase 
efficiency in transporting their products, and to facilitate creating new jobs [2]. The 
engineers hired by the federal government were given a very different set of design ideas. 
From their perspective, form followed function [5]. The focus on traffic service 
disconnected the highway from its surrounds and its land-use [5]. The design also 
stemmed from safety, from fewer collisions. Efficiency took the reins of building 
highways. Vehicle speeds rose, the number of lanes rose, all while maintaining the same 
designs for each individual interchange, entrance, and exit to make the system safer for 
the driver [5]. Uniformity had power.  
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The engineers provided statistics and analytical techniques, eventually “winning 
the debate” over planners and their ideas that sacrificed vehicle throughput for the sake of 
the urban fabric [5]. The auto industry had a voice as well. Here again downtown 
business districts wanted to be more readily accessed by their customers. Congestion was 
the surface culprit. 
The urban freeway eventually came to embody the engineering ideals [6]. The 
reason is simple: those who embraced the engineering vision had access to the money 
needed to translate their vision into reality, while those who embraced the planning vision 
generally did not [6]. Planners, tired of arguing unsuccessfully for a more comprehensive 
and balanced approach to freeway planning, finally gave in to the desire of most 
Americans to pour concrete as quickly as possible to solve the problem of urban traffic 
congestion [5]. 
With funding being secured at the federal level, urban, suburban, and rural 
regions wanted their fair share. A network of highways was proposed for the entire 
country [7]. After ten years of debate within the federal government, the federal interstate 
highway system was about to be set in place. However, this system seemed to benefit 
only rural areas [7]. To get urban legislators on board, urban segments of this plan had to 
be designed and proposed, no longer by the individual cities, but by the committee set up 
for this nationwide system, and in eight months [7]. The decades of planning before were 
useless. Once the legislation was passed in 1956, cities had a choice to accept the 




Thus, these new downtown highway plans would quickly reshape urban form and 
travel patterns. The designs ripped the urban core apart, dividing neighborhoods, dividing 
races, and creating a sprawling periphery [2]. Interstate building peaked in 1966 and 





































Figure 1.4: The National Highway System, 2009 [9] 
Today and Tomorrow 
The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways has 
undoubtedly created prosperity through increased mobility and productivity [4]. 
Nonetheless, its hefty price tag was felt by the entire nation. In the long run, were 
freeways the most efficient way to managing the rise of private vehicle use? Or were 
there less-damaging ways? The consequences of transportation planning choices are not 
easy to overlook. 
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Such consequences of the National Highway System are seemingly endless. For 
one thing, downtown highways have caused a lack of connectivity between people and 
place. Place has become obsolete, except the inside of one’s car. Accessibility only exists 
for the vehicle, so long as the roads are not congested and the distance to travel is 
optimum. This leads users away from seeking alternative modes of transportation or 
alternate routes. Neighborhoods suffer with downtown highways. Cities have lost their 
freedom by creating physical and social barriers, which often magnify racial boundaries 
[2]. 
 The rapid decline of freeway-building by 1976, just twenty years after its 
commencement, was stopped in part due to citizens’ revolts [10]. Additionally, building 
simply stopped due to the lack of funding. In some cases the anti-highway movement 
made history in a big way, using popular and political pressure to block highway projects 
[10]. 
Control is slowly shifting back to the local and city level, as they search for ways 
to pay for an infrastructural system that works for them [11]. Planners are now forced to 
comply with the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, taking on the consequences of 
ignoring land use and the surrounding environment, both the social and physical parts in 
planning [11]. Transportation has a long way to go, for now its ad hoc planning is 
suggesting a positive change. Just as planners like Harland Bartholomew have suggested, 








 2.1 Consequences and Benefits 
 Although this paper aims to explain ways in which building downtown highways 
decrease connectivity between people and place, a more notorious consequence of urban 
freeways is their ability to create congestion. Transportation planners believe highways 
result in increased mobility, high-speed travel, and reduced conflicts [12]. A city without 
a freeway system may introduce pedestrian-vehicular conflict at every intersection 
(nonetheless, good design may be able to overcome this) [12]. In addition, without a 
highway, through-traffic could be at slower speeds, resulting in higher pollution and 
greenhouse gases [12]. Is the best way to untangle traffic by building more roads? Traffic 
studies all over the world have concluded one thing: the complexity in travel behavior 
prevents any theory about the reasons for congestion becoming fact. In other words, the 
reason has to do with the complex effects of individual drivers all trying to optimize their 
routes [13].  
 Some planners believe traffic to be counter-intuitive. If the demand of drivers is 
maintained at a constant level, congestion reaches a point at which it constrains further 
growth in “peak-period” trips [13]. The phenomenon of induced demand— or the “if you 
build it, they will come” effect— suggests new roads encourage people to drive more 
miles, resulting in the production of suburban sprawl, that shifts new users onto these 
roads [13]. Research indicates that generated traffic often fills a significant portion of 
capacity added to congested urban roads, as seen below in figure 5. As supply (road 
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capacity) increases, cost (time) should decrease. But with the cost of a trip decreasing, 
demand (drivers) increases which lengthens the travel time. Induced demand is a vicious 
cycle with a simple solution— to not add road capacity.  
 
Figure 2.1: How Expansion of Roadway Capacity Can Generate Traffic [13] 
 An introduction of one famous example demonstrating this paradox was by 
mathematician Dietrich Braess in1968, which shows that “one additional link to the 
network may cause longer travel times for every traveler if all travelers choose to 
minimize their own travel times” [13]. In this case, each traveler’s decision may achieve 
a user equilibrium that makes everyone worse off, and thus increases total travel time and 
cost [13]. Widening a highway could also encourage people to make more trips, longer 




Figure 2.2: The vicious cycle from the cover of Asphalt Bulletin, 1966 [13] 
 This illustration of roadway expansion promoting more travel reveals the thought 
process induced demand explains. Written at the peak of highway building in the United 
States, induced demand is not a new proposition. It just has new meaning. Many cities 
affected by the interstate-era now realize stimulating the need for more roads is not an 
accepted goal. What if this diagram replaced all words of pavement, asphalt, and roads 
with rails, tracks, and transit? 
Although improving congestion is not the main reason why a city would want to 
knock down a poorly planned highway, the counterpart of induced demand – reduced 
demand – can make a strong argument for doing so. Assuming population increases in an 
area, then demand to travel is following a congruent path. If this area chooses not to 
increase the supply of roadways, such as expanding a downtown highway, the cost of 
travel will reach a point in which users find alternatives. Likewise, if a downtown 
highway were reduced in size or removed all together, alternatives would be needed even 
faster. Such alternatives would ideally allow for what an urban freeway was designed for: 
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increased mobility, reduced conflicts, and optimal trip times and costs. What does this 
mean for the life of a city? 
The many beneficial reasons for urban freeway deconstruction are not as easily 
demonstrated by scientific theories. Tearing down a downtown highway is thought to 
help enliven an urban area, improve citizen health, restore the local environment, and 
energize the regional economy. However, it requires much thought on policy and design. 
Looking at completed projects of highway deconstruction in other cities has the potential 
to reveal validity in these ideas for improving urban areas. 
2.2 Comprehensive Project Listing 
 A common theme is that cities often consider highway removal when the highway 
becomes functionally obsolete. This occurs either at the end of the highway’s useful life 
or after natural disaster. Another theme is that highway removal decisions are usually 
made in the context of a significant shift of priorities. City leaders and citizens alike 
begin to prioritize the goals of sustainable urban development over those of the private 
vehicle. This latter lesson may have particular resonance for cities like Atlanta, Georgia. 
 The selected case studies serve multiple purposes. The examples illustrate potential 
alternative design and development scenarios. Additionally, the cases offer urban design 
strategies to suggest what can work and what will struggle to work. What are the most 
innovative ideas for redeveloping land reclaimed by highway removal? How have cities 
improved conditions around the freed spaces? Are the highway changes an integrated 
planning and urban design strategy or just an attempt to solve a local problem? An 
integrated approach identifies the full range of issues and opportunities – from urban 
design to open space, economic development, and the environment. The least imaginative 
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projects are those that consider the problem only from the perspective of transportation. 
 Often these case studies share a common context brought on by a significant social 
or economic change. The industrial land and waterfronts of the mid-twentieth century 
created a need for easy traffic access. As technology changed, so too did industrial types 
and locations.  Removing highways along former industrial territories and waterfronts are 
a major focus of highway redesign and removal. These are often related to cities’ 
reclaiming waterfronts or brownfields for parks, new residential developments or civic 
institutions.  
 The shift to the suburbs to get access to more land at lower costs for the expanding 
post WWII urban population was a primary argument for urban highways. However, after 
securing a way for convenient access to central business districts, cities changed 
radically.  Population growth— in quantity, coverage and density— increased demand 
for road capacity, along with the dependency on automobiles with the decline of transit. 
With costly travel time, bedroom communities became home to offices, retail space, and 
institutions. As a result, some cities have highways that no longer serve their original 
purpose. Instead of aiding access to the central business district, highways are parts of 
larger metropolitan networks and often have primary roles for local traffic, moving short 
distances. Or they are used for regional traffic passing through the center of cities. These 
highways are more difficult to remove, but can be redesigned.  
 The realization that cities have the power to change their downtown highways has 
created an unprecedented quantity of planning proposals from cities around the world. 
The following map and table is a selection of these cities and their projects, whether 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.3: World Map of Project Sites 
(See Appendix A for a scale comparison of each case study’s project site) 
2.3 Selected Case Studies 
2.3.1 Boston, Massachusetts 
Boston was an early participant in freeway planning. Boston’s first regional 
freeway plan, the Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for Boston, proposed the construction 
of a radial combined parkway and freeway network whose primary purpose was to 
provide better access into and through severely congested downtown Boston [14]. The 
infamous Central Artery was among the facilities that were proposed by Robert H. 












Figure 2.4: Freeway Plan for the City of Boston and the Regional Core, 1965 [14] 
Yet it wasn’t until post World War II that the Central Artery was initially 
constructed. It was built as a partly elevated and divided highway. Immediately, residents 
began to hate the new highway and the way it towered over and separated neighborhoods 
[15]. Due to this opposition, the southern end of the Central Artery through the South 
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Station area was built underground, through what became known as the Dewey Square 
Tunnel [15]. The idea of building the entire Artery underground was first expressed in the 
1970s emanating from the central artery depression concept developed by the Boston 
Transportation Planning Review [15].  
The East Boston Elevated Highway was designed to connect the Sumner Tunnel 
with the Logan International airport and to provide a high-speed expressway through East 
Boston to connect with the existing highway to the north [15]. The six-lane expressway 
rose above the streets of East Boston. In 1977, the state spent $10 million and seven 
months to rebuild the elevated roadway sections, but the expressway remained flawed 
because of its designs, such as sharp curves, a lack of shoulders, and inadequate 
acceleration-deceleration lanes [15].  
 
Figure 2.5: Boston, Massachusetts in 1981 [16] 
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Building the Artery along Boston’s waterfront seemed most logical. Boston’s 
business district, once centered on shipping, was located here [17]. But the Artery cut 
into the urban forms of Boston. It kept pedestrians from the water. The downtown 
highway’s height overwhelmed low-rise streets and historic public spaces and places, 
leaving the area with traffic, noise, and shadow [17]. The Italian North End was simply 
erased, displacing its small businesses and hundreds of families [17]. Owners of some 
buildings that escaped the bulldozers bricked over windows that faced the Artery [17]. 
Though it did enable suburban workers to get to new office jobs, the Artery 
quickly became obsolete. The expressway was increasingly choked with bumper-to-
bumper traffic. Business leaders were more concerned about access to Logan Airport, and 
pushed instead for a third harbor tunnel [15]. Poorly designed and constructed, it had 
structural problems and an accident rate four times the national average, because drivers 
veering toward the highway’s downtown exits collided with drivers continuing to the 
airport [17]. With limited access that urban highways often provide, the traffic had 
nowhere else to go. 
Eventually, the entire highway would be moved underground as part of the Big 
Dig Project. (The Dewey Square Tunnel was the one part of the original Artery not torn 
down; it now serves southbound traffic [17].) Planning for the Big Dig as a project 
officially began in 1982. After years of extensive lobbying for federal funding, the 
project had its green light and ground was first broken in 1991 [15]. 
The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), which did not have the experience 
to manage a project this size, hired the firm of Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff to provide 
preliminary designs, manage consultants and contractors, track the project's cost and 
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schedule, advise MTA on project decisions, and help represent them [17]. Parsons was an 
expert in innovative urban tunneling dating to the early twentieth century, when it built 
New York City’s subways [17]. Bechtel had constructed the Hoover Dam [17]. However, 
a task this complex surely could have benefitted from the oversight of a federal 
administering group, rather than seeking private help.  
The “Big Dig” was expected to cost $5.6 billion and totaled $14.8 billion at 
completion [18]. In short, the sticker shock for the public has created lawsuits against 
certain entities that did know estimates were far lower than they should have been [17]. 
In addition to political and financial difficulties, the project faced several environmental 
and engineering obstacles. The downtown area through which the tunnels were to be dug 
was largely landfill, and included existing subway lines as well as innumerable pipes and 
utility lines that would have to be replaced or moved [18].  
 
Figure 2.6: Map of the “Big Dig’s” Project Borders [19] 
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Tunnel workers encountered many unexpected geological and archaeological 
barriers, ranging from remnants of glaciers to foundations of buried houses and a number 
of sunken ships lying within the reclaimed landfill [18]. 
 
Figure 2.7: Boston’s downtown highway edging the harbor, 1990 [20] 
Travel time through downtown at afternoon rush hour has decreased from nearly 
twenty minutes to less than three, consistent with pre-construction estimates [17]. 
However, speed is becoming a problem within the tunnels [17]. Nonetheless, downtown 
Boston remains uncongested for the first time in generations. Now that downtown 
Boston’s streets are open and urban form is transformed, the biggest challenge is working 
with the existing architecture and seamlessly weaving together the once-divided areas. 
This freed-up “no man’s land” currently is zoned for the Rose Kennedy Greenway, a 
system of parks. Nonetheless, this vital area needs some serious thought. The citizens of 
the neighborhoods and the businesses of the waterfront have an opportunity to come 
together and enliven the city. 
Investors and residents are responding positively to the infrastructure 
improvement. As the Boston Globe reported in 2004, “commercial properties along the 
old Artery increased in value by 79 percent in 15 years, nearly double the citywide 
increase of 41 percent” [17]. Owners have reconfigured buildings to open views where 
they once bricked up windows and are renovating property in other newly accessible 
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parts of Boston [17]. The North End’s Italian restaurants are bringing back history as they 
once hid from the Artery.  
 
Figure 2.8: Boston’s new greenway park system, Safdie Architects, 2002 [21] 
 








Figure 2.11: Constructing the elevated highway, 1956 [2] 
 




Figure 2.13: And now the greenway, 2009 [22] 
2.3.2 Manhattan, New York 
 
The New York City parkway, originally intended to be a recreational road, 
enjoyed the luxury of a wide roadway, which kept it from the city’s other roads and 
allowed grade-level access to be eliminated [23]. Furthermore, this roadway was curved 
to follow the undulations of the river and the surrounding topography without requiring 
excessive cuts and fills. The entire length of the parkway was landscaped to blend in with 
the surrounding parkland and prevent erosion, and a high standard of architectural design 
was required of all bridges and other built structures [23]. The city’s first parkway, which 
opened to traffic in 1923, was immediately popular and led to the construction of more 
parkways in and around the urban area. [23] 
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The West Side Highway, officially named the Miller Elevated Highway in honor 
of former Manhattan Borough President Julius Miller, was part of the system of freeways 
created by New York’s highway builder Robert Moses [23]. The stretch between Canal 
St. and 72nd St. was built between 1929 and 1936, connecting at 72nd St. with Moses’ 
Henry Hudson Parkway [23]. Beginning in 1938, the highway was extended south of 
Canal St. to connect with the Battery, but construction of this stretch was interrupted by 
World War II and was not completed until 1948 [23]. Finally, in 1950, the highway was 
connected with the new Brooklyn Battery Tunnel at the south end [23].  
Because it was the world’s first elevated highway, there were no design standards 
when it was built. The West Side Highway’s design was unsafe because of its sharp 
curves and its narrow lanes and entrance ramps [25].  
 




Figure 2.15: A ramp for the West Side Highway, 1974 [24] 
The West Side Highway needed an overhaul soon after because of corrosion from 
weather and wear. In 1969, it was closed briefly when part of it collapsed, but it was 
quickly repaired [25]. Then in late fall of 1973, a cement truck going to make a repair on 
another part of the West Side Highway caused a 60 foot section of northbound roadway 
through Chelsea to collapse [25]. The highway was closed between the Battery and 57th 
St while engineers determined whether this section could be repaired. The ultimate 
demise of New York City’s West Side Elevated Highway began here. 
 For the next 10 years, plans were made to replace the West Side Highway 
with the Westway, another interstate which would make its way along the west side of 
Manhattan. However, those plans were undoubtedly discarded with its billion-dollar cost 
estimations and political opposition in 1985 [25]. Moreover, just to repair the highway 




Figure 2.16: Map of the section of highway under repair and the neighboring, abandoned 




During the 1960s, citizen opposition stopped many of Robert Moses’ freeway 
projects, including three proposed cross-Manhattan freeways, which would have torn up 
the city’s urban fabric by demolishing swaths of land a block wide to build freeways 
crossing Manhattan [23]. The Westway was no different. Community opposition pressed.  
Resistance to Westway appeared at all of the meetings where citizens were 
allowed to comment on the project and its environmental studies [25]. After the Army 
Corps of Engineers got its permit in August 1981, the Clean Air Campaign and other 
groups sued [25]. Surprisingly, in 1982, legislature stopped work on the project, on the 
grounds that the Army Corps of Engineers had not considered the impact of landfill on 
striped bass in the Hudson River [25]. After three more years, efforts were inadequate 
and the court still refused to allow construction to begin. 
The city had survived for a dozen years without this highway. After such a long 
time without a freeway, Westway looked less like a replacement and more like a new 
freeway project extending into Manhattan, which would generate more traffic as new 
freeways do. In September 1985, New York City decided to abandon Westway [25].  
 




Figure 2.18: Cross-Sections of the roadway proposed [24] 
Of the $1.7 Billion in federal highway funds that had been allocated to build 
Westway, the city shifted 60% to improving mass transit [25]. It shifted the other 40% of 
these funds, plus an additional $121 million of city and state funds, to the West Side 
Highway Replacement Project [25]. This project was capped at $811 million, only able to 
make modest improvements to existing roads and to create a new park along the river 
[25]. 
It took a decade more before the sections of the highway were demolished. 
During that time, the abandoned road became a popular place for jogging and bicycling, 
and concerts were held there [23]. Seeing how the city was connecting with the 
decommissioned highway, the neighboring elevated railway, abandoned, held a new 
ambition. As the first repurposing of infrastructure of its kind in the United States, this 
railway now called the High Line, has been retained. The reconstruction process of a 
pedestrian parkway is nearly finished. Elevators and stairways provide access to it. The 
High Line has all of the essentials of any public park, with the added safety from 
vehicular conflicts. The elevated form may not cause social separation from its surrounds. 




Figure 2.19: Satellite View of the section through Clinton, 1990 [19] 
 




Figure 2.21: The High Line enters a former meatpacking building, 2004 [24] 
In May 1993, the city finally adopted an alternative [25]. The project was 
completed in 2001; twenty-eight years after the West Side Highway collapsed and was 
closed permanently [25]. This project simply improved the existing West Street, which 
had originally been the bordering street to the Hudson River in the early twentieth 
century. It then became the street below the elevated West Side Highway [23]. By adding 
19-foot wide landscaped medians, a bicycle path, and landscaped park along the river, 
these urban design elements emphasized the continuity of this street and park [25]. 
Most of this street contains four lanes in each direction. At 57th Street, it connects 
with a section of the original West Side Highway (or Route 9A) viaduct, restored at a 
cost of $80 million, which leads to the Henry Hudson Parkway. The bicycle paths and 
parks are part of the planned East Coast Greenway [25]. They will ultimately connect 
with parks in the proposed Riverside South development below 72nd Street, which will 
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connect with Frederick Law Olmstead’s Riverside, and ultimately with the planned 
Hudson River Valley Greenway extending to Albany [25].  
 
Figure 2.22: The Hudson River Park Adjacent to Today’s West Street, 2009 
 
Figure 2.23: View of West Street and a finished area of the High Line, 2010 [19] 
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2.3.3 San Francisco, California 
 
 In the United States, San Francisco is the city most known for the positive effects 
on urban life from freeway removal. Two corridors in this city have been the start of this 
revolution: Embarcadero Freeway (now known as The Embarcadero) and Central 
Freeway (now Octavia Boulevard). The Embarcadero corridor lies on the eastern edge of 
downtown San Francisco intersected by the city’s main downtown road, Market Street. 
The former Central Freeway traversed a first-tier ring outside of downtown San 
Francisco, serving a mixed-use corridor. The areas lie 2.3 miles apart [26]. 
 
Figure 2.24: Partial map of the 1963 Thoroughfares in downtown San Francisco [27] 
In red are the two corridors, Embarcadero on the right, Central in the center. 
The Embarcadero freeway was 1.2 miles long. Its infamous stub along the water 
proved that the freeway had plans to expand [26]. The Central Freeway spanned through 
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the center of San Francisco, crossing over Market Street and connecting Highway 101 
onwards to the Golden Gate Bridge. Both served as critical arteries in funneling motorists 
in and out of the city. News of additional freeway construction was seeing opposition as 
early as 1956 [26]. For the first time in history, proposals for seven of the ten planned 
freeways were canceled [26]. 
Then, in 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake damaged the Embarcadero Freeway 
and other freeways in the Bay Area - reopening the debate about whether the city should 
remove or repair certain freeways. For San Francisco, demolition of these two elevated 
highways, along with streetscape enhancements, has radically transformed the city’s 
downtown waterfront, creating an attractively landscaped, pedestrian-friendly corridor 
just west of downtown San Francisco.  
Embarcadero Freeway 
 




Figure 2.26 Aerial View of Embarcadero Freeway, 1978 [28] 
The Embarcadero Freeway was closed after the earthquake, and there were some 
temporary traffic snarls, but by the time the city made the decision about this freeway, 
traffic had adjusted to new conditions [26]. There was no gridlock with the freeway 
closed, so opponents lost their strongest argument for repairing it. In its place today: a 
waterfront boulevard with bike trails, parks, and public exhibitions. 
After the freeway was removed, in 1991, real estate values in adjacent 
neighborhoods went up by 300 percent [26]. Entire new neighborhoods, oriented to the 
waterfront, were built and thrived in areas that had been hard to develop when the 
freeway stood as a wall that cut them off from the waterfront [29]. The corridor formerly 
occupied by a double-decked freeway has been transformed into a multi-lane boulevard 
flanked by a promenade of wide sidewalks, ribbons of streetlights, mature palm trees, 




Figure 2.27: Demolition of the highway, 1990s [28] 
 





Figure 2.29: Original Path of the Central Freeway, 1989 [27] 
 Like the Embarcadero freeway, San Francisco’s Central Freeway was partly built 
during the 1950s before it was stopped by the city’s freeway revolt. All that was built was 
a highway “spur” [26]. Unlike the Embarcadero freeway, the Central Freeway was not on 
spectacular waterfront property, so there was not an early movement to remove it. But 
after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, this freeway was also damaged and closed, 
inspiring a movement to remove it rather than repair it [26].  
 Removing the elevated Central Freeway and replacing it with a new 
surface street was a more drawn out, complicated process than with Embarcadero as the 
series of Google Earth aerial photos reveal [19]. The very northern section of the freeway 
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was demolished right after Loma Prieta because it was so damaged [26]. Six years later, 
more sections were removed so that an out-of-place off ramp was all that remained [19].  
 
 
Figure 2.30 View from the neighborhoods, 1960s [28]  
The battle over removing the Central freeway dragged on for many years. The 
main opponents of removal were residents of west San Francisco. Ultimately, the city 
decided to remove the Central Freeway and replace it with a ground-level boulevard, 
which opened up land for new housing and led to the revival of the surrounding Hayes 
Valley neighborhood [26]. A multi-way boulevard was a natural solution: a 133-foot-
wide Parisian-style passageway with four central through-lanes, two peripheral lanes, and 
on-street parking [29]. A central median and side strips would provide safe haven for 
pedestrians— an important consideration given some motorists would be former freeway 
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users. By 2005, the construction was complete and the new urban surface street was 
named Octavia Boulevard [29]. Although the boulevard is well used, it is no more 
congested than the far larger highway that it replaced, showing that traffic responds the 
environment in which it is placed. However, recent study shows its transition from the 
highway to the urban areas could have been designed better. Pedestrians feel unsafe and 
neighbors are not as pleased with the aesthetics [26]. Thus, to accommodate increased 
traffic, city engineers introduced a dynamic signalization system that allowed “green 
waves” of traffic that formerly moved on elevated freeways to move swiftly along city 
streets used also by pedestrians and cyclists. Nonetheless, fast-moving surface-street 
traffic is a prime offense in the minds of many New Urbanists [29]. 
There was a lot of hyperbole about the traffic nightmares that would be caused by 
the removal of these downtown highways. Fortunately, these scenarios never 
materialized, though traffic congestion continues to worsen in San Francisco, as it has in 
all U.S. cities with growing economies [26]. 
 




2.3.4 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
 Milwaukee's Park East Freeway never reached the projected traffic capacities that 
it was built for [24]. It was a disruption to the street grid of the downtown area [24]. To 
restore the traditional urban form, the city made a proposal to remove the highway [24]. 
Land attached and adjacent to Park East would have a chance for a new zoning code of 
mixed-use development [24]. The highway was 30 years old and in need of repair. The 
cost of reconstruction was projected at $100 million. Demolishing the freeway had a cost 
of $25 million, with the federal government paying 80% of the cost.  
 
Figure 2.32: The Park East was never completed and thus underused [24] 
Because of its low traffic volume, the state dropped its opposition to removing the 
Park East freeway in 2000. Moreover, traffic volume was low enough that state 
transportation planners found it was not necessary to build a boulevard to replace Park 
East. It would be enough simply to restore the local street grid and to build a new bridge 
across the Milwaukee River. The choice was obvious. 26 acres of land were cleared for 
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new development. Surrounding areas have attracted investments of over $300 million in 
new expansion.  
A study found that the project would have even less impact on traffic than the 
original study predicted, because it offered better connections with existing streets [24]. 
This study also revealed that existing roads could easily accommodate the increased 
traffic [24].  
Demolition of the Park East freeway began in June 2002 and was completed in 
April 2003 [24]. The reconstructed Knapp St. Bridge across the Milwaukee River and a 
restoration of the street ultimately increased connectivity to the waterfront [24]. In 
addition, restoring the street grid reduced congestion by dispersing traffic [24]. When 
there was a freeway, off ramps concentrated all of the traffic on three streets. Now, it is 
diffused to at least twenty four [24].  
The city expects the freeway removal to bring over $250 million of investment in 
the Park East redevelopment area [24]. $140 million already has been invested and five 
new projects representing $199 million are planned [24]. The freeway removal has also 
helped to stimulate growth in nearby locations that are not in the redevelopment area 
itself. On the former site of the Pabst brewery, a proposal including restaurants, offices, 




















































Figure 2.34: Proposed plans to the waterfront [24] 
 
 
2.3.5 Portland, Oregon 
During the 1960’s, Portland’s downtown was declining, similar to other central 
business districts throughout the United States [27]. This is at least partially due to the 
rise in construction of urban highways funded by the federal government. The housing  
supply and retail business in the downtown declined drastically [27]. The suburban-like 
mall, the Lloyd Center, opened in 1960, and business kept declining as more malls 
opened [27]. Downtown had few restaurants or events that attracted people to the district 
[27]. Furthermore, the city’s air pollution was worsening,  and the resulting fines 
threatened to bankrupt the city [27].  
Originally completed in 1942, Harbor Drive was a four-lane freeway along the 
west bank of the Willamette River, cutting off pedestrian access from downtown to the 
river [27]. This public works project was funded by the Roosevelt Administration to 




Figure 2.35: Harbor Drive and the west bank, around 1964 [27] 
Portland made a decision to focus less on the private vehicle and more on 
pedestrians and public transportation [27]. In May, 1974, the state of Oregon closed 
Harbor Drive so it could use the land to build Tom McCall Waterfront Park, which would 
open up the waterfront to pedestrians, creating an important amenity for downtown [27]. 
Later that same summer, the Portland City Council decided against the Mount Hood 
Freeway proposal and instead used the freeway’s federal funding to build transit projects 
[27]. Preventing this freeway eliminated all the freeway projects that were to follow 
[27]. A comprehensive land use plan in 1980 was adopted to establish an urban growth 
boundary and to concentrate development towards the public transportation system [27].  
The state began closing portions of Harbor Drive after the Fremont Bridge was 
completed to carry traffic to parallel roads [27]. Within a few months the entire road was 
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closed and development of the park began [27]. This park opened in 1978 and a series of 
extensions to the park began [27]. Redevelopment around the waterfront was designed by 
a city-sponsored competition called the RiverPlace Project [27]. Completed in 10 years, 
500 housing units, an 84-room hotel, 4000 square-feet of retail space, and a marina were 
added [27]. 
In addition to this development directly linked to waterfront, there is no doubt that 
replacing the freeway contributed to the overall revitalization of downtown [27]. 
Riverfront for People, the same group that led the fight to remove Harbor Drive, is now 
promoting a plan to remove Interstate-5 from the east side of the Willamette River, to 
stimulate similar redevelopment and smarter growth [27].  
 





2.3.6 Seattle, Washington 
In 1975, Freeway Park became the “deck-the-freeway” concept and began getting 
some serious attention. Because of the constrained geography of Seattle, Interstate 5 was 
environmentally damaging the area [30]. Traffic seemed to encircle the historical First 
Hill, a residential neighborhood [30]. The city of Seattle demanded a change and sunk the 
interstate into a trough that was capped over. Due to the Environmental Policy Act, the 
city’s bond initiative was forced forward [30]. Freeway Park opened in time for the 1976 
Bicentennial Celebration and gained national recognition, becoming a model for other 
cities damaged socially and environmentally by their downtown thoroughfares [30].  
 
Figure 2.37: The capping of the highway with the park [19] 
 Freeway Park is beautiful and memorable, but its design with the urban 
environment calls for improvement [30]. Acoustics allow for muffling the sound of the 
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highway below the park [30]. The complicated structural design must have a different set 
of standards because of the project’s purpose as a pedestrian zone, not just as a roadway 
bridge. In addition, a capping project of this age has revealed high maintenance costs that 
continue to rise. The park also has some safety and design issues that the city is now 
seeking to resolve, such as better outdoor lighting and updating planters [30]. 
2.3.7 Duluth, Minnesota 
In 1970, the plan for I-35 in downtown Duluth was designed to be located along 
the old rail lines [23]. The highway would help traffic bypass the downtown streets [23]. 
For environmental reasons this highway was due for reconstruction. Spray from Lake 
Superior onto the highway’s southeast edge was a hazard [23]. To protect I-35 the 
proposed freeway would have to be elevated 20 feet into the air on concrete columns, 
creating a massive physical barrier between the waterfront and the city of Duluth [23]. A 
large concrete seawall would also have to be built to further protect automobiles from the 
weathering of the lake [23]. Furthermore, the plan called for a large interchange between 
the freeway and Lake Avenue right in front of the central historic district, which would 
have required the demolition of much history [23]. 
The city agreed for the need of the urban freeway; however, the downtown 
framework and life could be taking a back seat. Alternatives to the proposed design, such 
as relocating or burying the highway were far too expensive. During the redesign process, 
the citizens of Duluth who had long since turned their backs on the waterfront area 
rediscovered that Lake Superior was indeed a great asset to the community [23]. The 
freeway’s design needed to emphasize “importance along the waterfront” [23].  
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The possibilities began to take shape and the idea of elevating the highway turned 
into a capping project, adding real estate. Due to the covering, traffic could be protected 
from the lake’s spray [23]. Additionally, the park could be used to connect downtown 
Duluth to the waterfront, something that had not existed since the railway was 
introduced.  
By the 1990s, Lake Place and its greenway were serving as a venue for the 
display of public art. Over one million dollars was spent on scenic enhancement of the 
freeway alone; landscaping and plantings along the freeway were carefully selected and 
arranged. Even the retaining walls had an aesthetic value, perhaps reminding drivers of 
what is above them.  
 
Figure 2.38: The Jay Cooke Plaza and Tunnel in Duluth [23] 
The Duluth story typifies the dynamics of the urban freeway in America. 
Architects, city planners, engineers, politicians, and anyone concerned about the urban 
environment must see to it that solutions like those in Duluth are possible [23]. More 




Figure 2.39: A section of I-35 during construction, 1990 [19] 
 
Figure 2.40: 2010 [19] 
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2.3.8 Seoul, South Korea 
Beginning in 1925, the Japanese covered many of the Cheonggyecheon River’s 
tributaries, converting them into covered sewers as part of a project to create an 
underground sewage system for Seoul [24]. In 1968, a road and elevated freeway were 
built above it. As years of neglect and development had left the stream nearly totally dry, 
water had to be pumped in daily [24]. Safety problems also occurred due to the 
deteriorated concrete construction. By the year 2000, the Cheonggyecheon area was 
considered the most congested part of Seoul [24]. Citizens agreed that the downtown’s 
highway was the central source of the lack of connectivity to urban life and its removal 
would stimulate the area in a positive way [24]. 
After fifty years of debate, the river was uncovered— a sign of progress [24]. This 
“daylighting” is now a commonplace term for re-opening an urban waterway, hidden by 
man in the past [24]. Restoration of the Cheonggyecheon fit with the trends to re-
introduce nature to the city and to promote a more eco-friendly urban design [24]. Other 
goals of the project were to restore the history and culture of the region, and to revitalize 
the economy of Seoul. The Seoul Metropolitan Government established several 
organizations to oversee the successful restoration. Freeway demolition began in June 
2003 and both the removal and the excavation were completed in September 2005 [27].  
The Cheonggyecheon daylighting revealed the natural environment and the 
historic resources of Seoul, reinforcing the surrounding businesses. The river was the 
vital part of the campaign for highway removal. To relieve congestion problems, Seoul 
began constructing its first Bus Rapid Transit line underground [27]. Pride and balance 




Figure 2.41: The Highway in downtown Seoul, 1990s [24] 
 
Figure 2.42: The restored Cheonggyecheon flows through the center of Seoul [27] 
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The projects discussed here have proved that the game has changed for downtown 
highways. Although each city is quite different, all of these case studies are proving to be 
a part of a restoration process. Each project was an attempt to undo previous damage to 
the urban fabric, to correct mistakes, and each aimed to reach goals to enhance pedestrian 
connectivity and strengthen economic vitality. The primary lesson is that highway 
alterations clearly must be related to a broader urban design process. Highway alterations, 
just like highway design and building, must be part of a more comprehensive process and 
strategy. The evidence from the history of highway design and buildings, and from the 
case studies, is that single purpose highways are a thing of the past. (Refer to Appendix B 






Restoring sustainable urban form by altering urban highways has been the 
primary motivation in the various strategies for demolition, removal, relocating, etc.. 
Whether concealed under the rubble, such as in Milwaukee’s case, or revealed when a 
waterfront was opened up, the objective was to restore or reconstruct sustainable, 
walkable, connected urban form.  
Seven urban design strategies have been drawn from the case studies and the 
comprehensive project listing. Each of these alternatives presents a conceptual way to 
solve a given highway situation. Each integrates proposals for road and infrastructure 
reconfiguration with public transit and pedestrian solutions, design of the public realm, 
and redevelopment opportunities. Certain conditions set the stage for what makes each 
solution workable. 
3.1 Bury 
Highway removal, or in this classification, a highway concealment, immediately 
opens up land adjacent to and on the surface of the former highway. These rights of way 
and adjacent areas have become social and physical deadzones. But when they are 
repurposed, the deadzones can restore the previous urban form and make adjustments to 
the previous form for contemporary uses.  
In Boston’s new Greenway over the buried highway, buildings that once turned 
their backs on the old Central Artery are now beginning to open up toward the Greenway, 
creating new entries in buildings and opening up boarded windows. Only three years after 
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the reopening of Boston’s downtown streets, the new land and frontages are continuing to 
develop and mend the wound of the Central Artery. There was urban life before the 
Central Artery plowed through the city. A historic framework was already in place to 
work with.  
In the future, the cost of burying a highway will be a primary consideration and a 
likely constraint. The critical question is whether such a project is worth the cost, both of 
construction and long term maintenance, which will always be greater for underground 
highways. Will Boston, for example, find the tunnel to be a wise investment in the long 
term? Will the benefits outweigh the costs? Skepticism remains in Boston.  
Seattle hopes to redesign its Alaskan Way Viaduct, an elevated highway that 
stretches along the harbor’s coast. Initially placed there in 1959 to serve industries and 
downtown access on relatively inexpensive land, the freeway cuts the waterfront off from 
the city. Maintaining the aging Viaduct is costing the city more every year. One 
alternative was recently proposed to bury the highway and open up the waterfront for 
public and private development, with the cost estimated to be $5 billion or more.. 
Boston’s experience with the big dig was a major reason citizens of Seattle disapproved. 
Still open to ideas, the City continues looking for ways to remove the highway. Its 
structural corrosion is an eyesore and a safety concern. When burying the highway failed 
public approvals, the current idea is to create an at-grade boulevard, which involves 
shifting traffic to other modes for transportation. This is a case where one strategy failed, 




Figure 3.1: The Alaskan Way Viaduct in Seattle, 1976 [30] 
 






Removals prove to be a fraction of the direct cost of highway burial or other 
strategies for alteration. However, real savings occur only when the highway is actually 
no longer needed, otherwise new investments in other roadways or transit will be 
required. An advantage of highway demolition is the right-of-way can be filled with a 
variety of programs, and the reuse possibilities are many. However, the reuse planning 
must be an integral part of the urban design strategy for the removal. Measuring costs and 
benefits remains the key factor.  
Portland, Oregon chose to remove a highway and to make a park and a mixed-use 
development, with planned transit replacing auto usage. On the other hand, Seoul, Korea 
chose to daylight a river flowing where the highway had been. San Francisco demolished 
the Embarcadero freeway and opened up the existing waterfront, extending a boulevard 
and parks, while the area continues to take shape with developments for mixed-use. 
Until recently, making changes to downtown highways was focused on increasing 
road capacity and speed and decreasing conflicts. Safety and convenience for one mode 
of transportation, the private vehicle, set the standard. Removing a highway seemed 
entirely wasteful. Auto-drivers, especially, resisted any change that decreased highway 
capacity or convenience. This makes a demolition strategy the hardest to carry out 
because it requires a change in day to day live for many people, not all of whom will 
benefit from removal. It is important to note that all of the highway demolitions cited in 
the case studies are in densely packed urban areas where other highways and reliable and 
convenient public transportation options are available.  
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With more advanced understanding and consideration for the dynamics of traffic 
movement, congestion, and the expansion of transit, downtown highway removal may 
prove to be the smart move. Demolition not only has a small price tag in comparison to 
other strategies, but new real estate development can bring in substantial investments, in 
some cases enough to pay for the removal itself. Additionally, public spaces created may 
have important civic value.  
3.3 Tame – Highway to Boulevard 
Although this involves a demolition of the highway, the right of way is reused for 
automobile access purposes instead of other, non-highway or non-transportation uses. 
Instead, the right of way is converted into a boulevard. Speed and single purpose 
movement is altered to plan for multi-purpose movement including automobiles, 
pedestrians transit, and bicycles, creating public spaces, and providing greater 
connectivity. The design of a wide median can be used for a potential transit system. For 
Paris’s inner peripherique boulevards the medians were used as rest stops (with benches) 
and as a safe haven for pedestrians before the city’s tram was fully constructed. If 
designed well, an at-grade boulevard can even reduce crime [12]. 
A boulevard cannot just be seen as a street. The right-of-way is essentially a linear 
park with precise intentions. Barcelona’s Avinguda Diagonal is one of the main avenues 
of the downtown area. Its width allows for a number of programs to exist. At its widest, 
lanes for through-traffic are separated by lanes for local traffic. Transit is in the median 
and sidewalks are spacious. Interestingly enough, Avinguda Diagonal turns into a 
freeway as it exits the city.  
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Chattanooga, Tennessee has increasingly turned its attention to orienting recent 
downtown investments toward the Tennessee River. Doing so required replacing 
Riverfront Parkway with an urban boulevard and, subsequently, creating new waterfront 
open space. Chattanooga’s downtown grid was integrated with the boulevard, thereby 
creating pedestrian connections and new development parcels. By the 1990s, Riverfront 
Parkway no longer served its initial industrial use. In fact, the parkway had excess 
capacity. Its redesign was not an issue of accommodating traffic, but rather calibrating its 
dimensions for current volumes. Lanes were reduced to two, except for downtown, where 
it has four. Two additional downtown intersections were added to disperse potential 
congestion. 
For much larger United States cities, The West Side Highway in Manhattan and 
the Central Freeway in San Francisco are the two classic examples of taming a highway 
into a boulevard. Both elevated highways were damaged by natural causes. However, the 
initial removal of these highways became a lengthy process, both ranging 20 to 25 years. 
Once removed, each project took less than five years to become a boulevard. 
Additionally, today both are in the maturing process and adjacent real estate values have 
increased. 
“Highway to Boulevard” is essentially the most cost effective. It uses the same 
framework laid out by the demolished highway. It is easiest to maintain. However, in 
terms of investment, little or no new real estate is created. But property values on lots 
adjacent to the new boulevard would rise. As with any project, time is a major constraint 




Figure 3.3: Before the Removal of the West Side Highway, 1974 [24] 
 
Figure 3.4: West Street today, 2009 
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3.4 Partial Capping / Bridging 
In the United States, cities are increasingly placing freeway segments below grade 
and covering them with parkland and street. Whether called capping, decking, bridged, or 
lid shut, this is the most popular form of highway reconstruction. As automobile impacts 
become more and more disruptive, capping and bridging are now not only accepted but 
are expected [30]. . Projects where freeways are already below-grade are much more 
feasible than others, as in Phoenix, Arizona and Cincinnati, Ohio. Other examples show 
where newly constructed highways build the caps or bridges while the roadway is being 
completed.  
Cut-and-cover tunnels have helped to integrate highways into cities. They are less 
visible and some streets can continue overhead. The highway may still be blight, but the 
city can still be connected. Careful use of topography can blend the freeway into its 
surroundings [30]. By physically marrying the freeway structure with architecture, the 
freeway becomes part of the urban fabric. However, the direct marriage of freeway and 
building is rarely practical, due to costs for long span structures and noise, vibration, and 
security issues. Noise and vibration has become an issue in Seattle’s Freeway Park. In 
Atlanta, Georgia an office complex is built directly atop a section of freeway north of the 
downtown. However, the structure is not woven into the fabric of the city; rather it 
became a divisive element [30]. 
The latest highway caps have been New Jersey’s innovative highway redesigns in 
Trenton and Atlantic City. Real estate values doubled around the developments. Buffalo, 
New York’s “Skyway” has seen fierce debates over what to do with their urban freeway. 
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With political disagreement on a complete demolition, bridging over to the waterfront is a 
compromise to maintain road capacity while freeing up land.  
 
Figure 3.5: Trenton, New Jersey’s Riverwalk over US 29 - $150 million [30] 
3.5 Retain and Ameliorate 
The alternative to retain an urban freeway represents a continuation of the status 
quo with respect to maintenance costs and traffic volume, except in the case of 
ameliorating. By ameliorating a highway, it is maintained but modified—enhanced and 
improved. This sub-classification simply makes the design embrace the existing structure 
and its form as an opportunity, leading to innovative approaches and a visually 
distinguished urban space [33]. Like the design of the High Line in New York, 




Figure 3.6: A view from below the viaduct in Paris [33] 
The Viaducs des Arts in the heart of Paris, France changed the face of an elevated 
railroad to a Promenade Plantée with retail space below. The brick and masonry structure 
was constructed in the nineteenth century. The railroad closed in 1969. Fifteen years 
later, the city’s urban design agency developed a strategy for the viaduct. Demolishing 
the viaduct would create the difficult task of redesigning and rebuilding an entire 
corridor, into the adjacent historic streetscape. The decision to retain the viaduct and 
promenade allowed the design to emphasize the structure’s character and visual 
connections to the city. The archway restoration maintains historic identity. It has become 
an asset to the area, stimulating new investment in housing and commercial buildings.  
The Viaduc des Arts demonstrates a potential benefit to retaining existing 
infrastructure and how it may be successfully integrated into the public realm. The 
Promenade Plantée illustrates how potentially incompatible programs might co-exist in 
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the same place [33]. The tranquil elevated linear park is separated from the bustle of the 
retail street below. 
 
Figure 3.7: The Shanghai Street Greening [33] 
The greening of overpasses in Shanghai, China uses landscape planters to enhance 
visual quality of elevated highways. For Carrasco Square by West 8 in Amsterdam, 
varying surface materials activate the space under an elevated rail. Also in the 
Netherlands, a city has discovered an affordable means of retaining by ameliorating 
underneath the highway in the suburb of Zaanstaad. This unique strategy placed 
recreation, retail and public space below a freeway with a total cost of only $3 million. 
The function of the highway remained unchanged, but it created the opportunity to 
reconnect two neighborhoods. The under-highway development is heavily used by both 
neighborhoods and has stimulated new investment along it length. There are many 
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examples of using under-highway space. Their success depends on careful planning and 
integrating new programs with the surrounding neighborhoods.  
3.6 Relocate 
Relocation moves a freeway to another area within or outside the city. Essentially 
rebuilding, burying, or elevating a highway has the same affect. Beginning with 
demolition costs, relocating the highway means new construction as well as clearing of 
the new site. Some of the structure could be transferred to the new location cutting 
material costs. Yet repairing a highway is most often cheaper than relocating it. For this 
reason, the Central Artery project in Boston can be thought of as a “virtual freeway 
relocation” project [30]. Plans are being made to relocate a highway in Providence, 
Rhode Island twenty miles away. Funding is the issue pending. Rhode Island might take a 
closer look at ways to disperse traffic and avoid the expensive compromise of building 
another freeway.  
3.7 A Typology To Guide Urban Design Projects 
This typology, drawn from the case studies and wide range of projects, is a first 
attempt to categorize the variety of highway alteration projects as a way to set our 
alternative urban design strategies. This typology should be seen as a first effort that can 
be further developed, considering the very specific issues raised for each type. For, 
example, one type could be examined across all of the known projects in order to collect 
detailed traffic information for before and after. In addition, total project costs could be 
identified and compared. Other issues like the design and complications of public 
approvals could be examined from the local to the federal levels. This typology can be 




ATLANTA AND THE DOWNTOWN CONNECTOR 
 
The previous chapters set the stage for the rethinking the City of Atlanta’s 
Downtown Connector, the segment of Interstate 75/85 that passes through central Atlanta 
(figure D.1). Every city has a unique series of design challenges formed by a collection of 
layers, each with its own history. This history in Atlanta begins with the trails laid out by 
Native Americans along the Peachtree ridge, continuing through Atlanta’s role as the 
Southeast’s largest railroad hub, which invited the city’s destruction during the Civil 
War. The last century added two more layers: the airport that grew to bind Atlanta and 
the Southeast to global trade and the global economy and the Downtown Connector that 
grew to Atlanta’s highway system – I-75, I-85, I-20, I-285, Georgia 400 and many more. 
In Central Atlanta, highway construction and urban renewal combined to shape the city 
during the last half of the 20th Century.  
Toward the end of the 20th Century, the City of Atlanta began a renaissance, 
focused mostly in older neighborhoods near downtown and, later, in Midtown and 
Georgia Tech. The beginning of the 21st Century presents opportunities for continuing 
and expanding that renaissance. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the future of Midtown 
and Georgia Tech is the Downtown Connector. The question is whether the Downtown 
Connector should remain as it is, be removed, or be altered in some way to adapt to a city 
that increasingly wants to be walkable, transit oriented, connected, and livable in 
sustainable ways. This chapter sets out the background of the Downtown Connector and 
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then draws on the previous case studies and design strategies to suggest urban design 
approaches.  
4.1 Background 
William B. Hartsfield was Atlanta’s mayor from 1936-1961. He coined the phrase 
“the city too busy to hate” when describing Atlanta in the 1950s [31]. Racial problems in 
Atlanta were only beginning to be dealt with. His term in office was during a time of 
radical social change in the city. He “had the foresight to recognize that an expanded 
coalition reaching across racial lines could be put together” [31]. Biracial agreements 
begin to form and the mayor’s relationship with the downtown business elite gave him 
even more power [31].  
 The African-American population grew quickly. Continuing to separate land use 
and neighborhoods by race was becoming impossible [31]. Throughout Hartsfield’s term 
he made efforts not to displace any citizens of Atlanta in this era of social transition [31]. 
Nonetheless, the downtown business elite had a prominent voice in his decision-making 
and the future of Atlanta’s downtown [31]. In his first phase of physically restructuring 
Atlanta, his alliance with business leaders led him to believe that preserving the central 
business district was key to Atlanta’s economic future. [31].  
Making Plans 
 Universally referred to as the document that set the future of Atlanta's highway 
system, The Lochner Plan, prepared for the Georgia DOT by the H.W. Lochner Co. and 
DeLeuw, Catherand Co. in 1946, had its basis in the belief that highway and transit 
expansion was a key to Atlanta's economic prosperity. In 1946, voters approved a bond 
issue to implement the Lochner Plan.  
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 The downtown business community in Atlanta, like downtown groups across the 
country, strongly supported highway building as a way to  link suburbs with downtown 
businesses. Early plans for an expressway to pass west of downtown would have 
minimized residential displacement and actually cost less. However, the Lochner Plan,  
which the business leaders strongly supported, recommended the new expressway lead 
directly to downtown [31]. The Lochner Plan argued for the new highway to connect  the 
suburbs directly to downtown, but it also had another consequence:  it was to buffer 
African-American residential neighborhoods from the central business district [31]. For 
Hartsfield to get everyone on board he had to promise displaced residents homes through 
new public housing projects and other various neighborhood improvements. [31]. Thus, 
highway building and urban renewal were joined in the remaking of downtown Atlanta. 
[31]. 
 Despite city planners’ calls for "society-first" freeway planning during this time, 
Harland Bartholomew's work in the mid-1950s reflects the victory of a traffic-service 
orientation of  traffic engineers in the struggle to design and build urban freeways [5]. 
Bartholomew’s  1954 transportation plan for Atlanta proposed a grid of small highways 
to be built. The basis of the plan was a distribution of traffic to multiple highways 
reducing future congestion on the single, federally funded highway through Downtown. 
The plan continued to refer to  Bartholomew’s  cautions about coordinating transportation 
and land use that characterized his work from the 1920s to the 1940s and it also contained 
an explicit emphasis on the facilitation of high-speed vehicle travel within the urban area 




Figure 4.1: Adjustments to the Metropolitan Expressway Plan of Atlanta, 1954 [32] 
Bartholomew cautioned engineers in the routing of the new expressways, but his 
recommendations aimed toward the same goal as that of the engineers: “move more cars 
faster” [5]. Other modes of transportation played little to no role in this narrowly focused 
plan. He knew whomever had the money held the reins. 
The belief of the times was that expressways were a method to stay economically 
competitive and an approach to clear blighted areas. By 1969, over 122 miles of freeways 
in Atlanta were opened, most of which were just two lanes in each direction. Originally, 
it was thought that a perimeter beltway would define the limit of urbanization.  By the 
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time the beltway was completed, suburban development had spread well beyond it in all 
directions, eliminating the possibility of using it for an urban development boundary. In 
1971, the Vorhees Plan suggested a startling addition of freeways, including a need to 
acquire the right-of-way for another, larger perimeter highway. Although never 
implemented, the idea was not completely forgotten. The Vorhees Plan also defined the 
route of Georgia 400, which was eventually built from the northern suburbs to Buckhead, 
but not the planned extension into the center of the city in the early 1970’s. That right of 
way is now Freedom Park, with one segment including Freedom Parkway. Since the 
1970’s, the focus has been on attempts to reduce congestion by widening existing  
highways with more lanes, high design speeds, and minimal frills.  
 

















Figure 4.7: View of the Skyline from the 5th Street Bridge, 1964 [32] 
 
Figure 4.8: View of the Skyline from the 5th Street Bridge, 2009 [25] 
(Refer to Appendix C for additional historic photos of Atlanta) 
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4.2 Transportation Issues 
Atlanta is caught halfway, between its traditional sprawling self and a more 
upscale urban metropolis. The city offers neither the pedestrian and transit-oriented life 
of its status-seeking competition, nor the sophisticated urban living of a matured 
American city. Atlanta is a new city, built during the era of the automobile, highways, 
and urban renewal. Sprawl characterizes the vast majority of the urban area. The 
automobile is the only means of access – to work, to school, to shopping, to parks, or to 
any of the conveniences of everyday life. Funding continues to flow to highway projects, 
with the belief that congestion relief is just around the corner with the addition of yet 
another added lane.  
Atlanta’s inner city – the areas immediately around downtown – has begun a 
renaissance. Significantly, this is the area of the city that was built either before the 
automobile or during the times when the auto shared streets with pedestrians, trolleys, 
and busses. It has the traditional urban framework of streets and blocks that the vast 
majority of Atlanta lacks. It is also the location where the MARTA rail and even the bus 
systems work best. Finding solutions to transportation and building a livable city for the 
entire urban area is difficult to imagine. However, there are real potentials in the inner 
city for change. That has already begun to the north in Midtown and around Georgia 
Tech. However, this is also the place where the Downtown Connector splits the city and 
blights its edges.  
Robert Moses, Harland Bartholomew, and others prescribed a solution for traffic 
planning – fast and unimpeded movement and elimination of congestion – but that 
solution has become the problem.  As cities grow over time, congestion will remain. The 
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key is to address the problem in the broad sense of planning, where traffic planning is 
balanced and coordinated with transit, with making neighborhoods walkable, and with 
building mixed-use neighborhoods. Atlanta, and other cities like it, may not have the 
opportunity to change the entire urban area, but possibilities in older areas are very real. 
The case studies in Chapter 2 are almost all located in areas where the conflict between a 
highway and traditional urban form was present.  
The location of the Downtown Connector was not ideal when it was built, with 
three lanes in each direction. Moreover, the continued traffic-engineering-oriented 
strategies for congestion relief have now made the Connector a total of 14 lanes wide. 
With rush hour getting longer and longer every year, proposals are under discussion to 
build a tunnel or to double deck the connector – both of which are continued attempts to 
reduce congestion by adding more lanes.  
4.3 Recommendations 
4.3.1 Process 
Atlanta had a strong period of growth throughout the 1990s. Hosting the 
Olympics in 1996 helped boost the city’s identity and initiated changes. Atlanta — at 
least the area around downtown — is becoming a new kind of city. The question is this: 
what is next? 
There are three initiatives that promise to move Atlanta forward. First is the 
prospect of funding for transit as well as needed highway improvements. For the first 
time since the sales tax referendum in the early 1970’s to build MARTA, the region will 
vote on a sales tax referendum for transportation improvements in 2012 or earlier. This 
will potentially provide substantial funding for transit in the region. Second, the Beltline 
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project, transforming an old rail beltway into pedestrian-oriented developments, is still a 
stimulus to in-town living and business. As it evolves, and adds transit, it will attract 
more residents and businesses to central Atlanta and make Atlanta more livable and 
accessible. Third is the realization by the Federal Government that transit needs funding. 
All three of these coming together will provide an opportunity to address the Downtown 
Connector.  
Two important key conclusions from the case studies should guide Atlanta. One 
key emphasizes this: any proposal to address urban design or transportation issues – like 
the Downtown Connector – must be inclusive. Planning for traffic is no more important 
than planning for transit or pedestrians or bicycles – and for future public space, private 
building design, and land uses. Recent moves to coordinate the Departments of 
Transportation, Housing and Community Development, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency at the Federal level should be replicated in the State of Georgia and 
the City of Atlanta. No longer can decisions be made that are single purpose. That is the 
legacy that resulted in the Downtown Connector in the first place.  
A second key brings the focus on reducing traffic demand, an idea that is gaining 
credibility, given that adding highway capacity is increasingly difficult – including cost 
and neighborhood resistance – and that increasing capacity in highly auto-oriented urban 
areas actually results in continued, if not increased, congestion. Reducing demand 
requires a comprehensive approach – combining transit improvements, a more dominant 
pattern of mixed uses to reduce travel need. This could mean altering schedules to spread 
travel demand through the day and week, and other moves that are beyond the scope of 




The typology in Chapter 3 sets out six types of actions for addressing urban 
highways: Bury, Demolish, Tame, Partial Cap or Bridge, Retain and Ameliorate, and 
Relocate. All six of these options should be considered for the Downtown Connector 
balancing the larger and more important overall urban design and transportation issues.  
The first consideration, however, is to understand the present situation for both 
traffic issues and local context. Regarding traffic, other than peak hour congestion, the 
Downtown Connector is no longer a primary route to downtown Atlanta. Instead, it is a 
through traffic route for the metropolitan as well as the southeast region. It is estimated 
by some that more than 50% of the average daily traffic originates outside the I-285 
Perimeter and reaches destination out side the I-285 Perimeter. Regarding the local 
context, topography is a constraining factor as the highway passes parallel to the 
Peachtree Ridge and then descends below grade and under Peachtree Street and the 
Ridge. The Connector also is situated oddly in relationship to the multiple grid 
frameworks of central Atlanta, making the route through the city at least as complex as 
the Central Artery in Boston. 
Clearly, the eight-mile-long Downtown Connector would be first divided into 
smaller parts (figure D.1 maps four segments of the Downtown Connector). The 
northernmost section runs through Midtown on the east with Atlantic Station and most of 
the Georgia Tech campus on the western side. The stretch is 1.5 miles long. The northern 
tip is defined as the location where interstates 75 and 85 meet, at 17th Street. To the south, 
the North Avenue Bridge will mark the segment’s end. The southern section includes the 
Grady Curve. This section is mostly below grade with street crossings above. Near the 
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State Capitol building, the highway retaining walls are structured to accept a cap at some 
point in the future. Most of this southern section of the Connector could be capped in the 
future. The following discussion will focus only on the northern section, because that is 
the most complex situation and most in need of action.  
The topography of the northern segment undulates, going below grade at the 14th, 
10th, 5th, and North Avenue bridges and rising in between. It is at grade along most of its 
west side until the southern portion where it dips below grade and remains below after 
passing the North Avenue bridge. On its eastern edge, it begins below grade much sooner 
from 14th Street southward and is especially low at each bridge (figures D.2.1 - D.2.6 
diagram existing conditions of the Connector and figures D.3.1 – D.3.4 analyze four 
design strategies: bury, tame, cap and bridge, and retain and ameliorate). 
Burying the Downtown Connector is an unlikely action. First, the cost and time, 
as demonstrated by Boston’s Central Artery and the defeat of the Alaskan Way Viaduct 
highway project in Seattle, indicate that such a major and costly project would not be 
approved. In addition, lowering the Connector would disrupt traffic due to lane closings. 
It is unlikely that the public – commuters, businesses, and others – would allow such 
disruption. There are no logical alternatives for even reduced travel demand. Although 
burying would be the best solution for traffic engineering purposes, and perhaps could 
increase capacity in some manner, it is not realistic. Funds of that magnitude would better 
be spent on other transportation modes – MARTA expansion and improvement, 
commuter rail, and light rail.  
Taming the Connector – converting it into a multi-lane boulevard – could be a 
long-term strategy, but this would depend on coordination with many other actions to 
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reduce and relocate demand. Through traffic – that originates and ends outside the I-285 
Perimeter – would have to be re-routed to the Perimeter itself. Transit demands would 
require implementation with major facilities, including light rail, commuter trains, and 
additional MARTA trains. The possibility to reduce demand enough to convert the 
Connector into a multi-lane boulevard would be more feasible. Instead of burying the 
Connector, it would need to be filled so that intersections between the boulevard and 14th, 
10th, 5th and North Avenue would be at grade intersections. Taming is the best choice 
from an urban design perspective for Midtown and Georgia Tech. The excess right-of-
way could be developed with new buildings, their front entries facing the proposed 
boulevard, giving Georgia Tech and Midtown a dynamic fresh face and a new presence 
in Atlanta. The hurdles would be great, public resistance from automobile drivers would 
be fierce, and business interests would be sure to rebel against it. The first step in such a 
project would have to be public education to create a collective movement equal to the 
citizen movements that stopped other highway projects.  
Capping and Bridging has already started with the project that widened the 5th 
Street Bridge. However, that was a modest approach to what would be possible if the 
desire to connect Midtown and Georgia Tech were strong enough. The North Avenue 
Bridge could easily be converted into a wide cap that might contain new Georgia Tech 
facilities. The 5th Street Bridge could be widened substantially. The 10th Street and 14th 
Street bridges could be made into caps as well. Capping and Bridging would be more 
feasible because highway capacity would not be reduced. But, the costs would be 
substantial without any real estate return. Even if developments could build on the caps, 




Figure 4.9: The Fifth Street Bridge, 2008 
Burying or Bridging are undoubtedly the most expensive techniques. Precedents 
in Seattle, Milwaukee, Boston, and Cincinnati reveal that just two of the Connector’s 
eight miles could take over 30 years and cost billions of dollars. Keep in mind that 
Boston’s buried Central Artery is a 1.7-mile-long corridor, not including roadways under 
the harbors, and cost $14.8 billion. On the other hand, Manhattan’s removal of the West 
Side Highway and its creation of the five-mile West Street boulevard cost less than $1 
billion in under 10 years (appendix D refers to a summary chart that includes cost 
estimates of possible design strategies for Atlanta’s Connector). 
For the short run, retaining and ameliorating seem to be the best design strategy. 
Additionally, it can be based on several related actions, incorporating caps and bridges 
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where feasible. One possibility could add landscape—like an urban forestry program—to 
line both sides of the Connector with trees. This would require modest change 
eliminating some parking lots and, in the long term, relocating a small number of 
buildings. Other possibilities could be to install local streets on both sides, where 
possible, so that over time buildings could be designed or modified to front the local 
streets and the Connector instead of turning their backs or sides. If this were combined 
with new bridges and landscape elements, it could go a long way toward ameliorating the 













































Figure 4.11: The segment just south of Midtown at the Grady Curve [25] 
 
Figure 4.12: The segment just south of the Grady Curve through Summerhill at Turner Field [25] 
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Concluding Remarks for Atlanta 
Can Atlanta agree to address the Downtown Connector? At this time it is difficult 
to imagine. But, it was difficult for many to imagine Atlanta as the rail hub of the 
Southeast in 1837 when the city was founded. It was difficult for many to imagine 
Atlanta being the air transport hub of the Southeast, the busiest airport in the U.S, and 
linked to more global cities than any other airport in the U.S. when former Mayor 
Andrew Young declared Atlanta to be the “Next International City.” And, it was difficult 
for many to imagine that Atlanta would ever be the host of the 1996 Centennial Olympic 
Games. Imagining Atlanta without the Downtown Connector is easy. The next step is to 
make it happen – bury, demolish, tame, cap and bridge, ameliorate or even relocate – but 
the critical issue remains making traffic engineering and transportation planning 








 Through a rethinking of the Eisenhower National Highway System and 
conventional urban traffic engineering, urban designers and planners today have made 
rethinking downtown highways increasingly possible. Transportation needs are 
continually evolving. Demographics, economics, and lifestyle affect traffic demand. The 
highways of the mid-20th century, particularly in the United States, were designed with 
specific goals in mind. A key planning agenda was to connect downtowns to suburbs. 
Planners also sought to link industrial waterfronts to the new interstate highway system. 
With the current trends, those goals are often no longer necessary. Moreover, while there 
is always concern about urban highway congestion, sometimes traffic demand actually 
decreases over time, in part because drivers’ behaviors cannot be predetermined. In 
Chattanooga, for example, Riverfront Parkway no longer served as a though-route for 
industrial trucking in the Tennessee River Valley as it did in the 1960s. In fact, the 
parkway was underused before redesigning the road as an at-grade boulevard. 
 Traffic demand can also be managed. The most successful highway reconfiguration 
projects include changes to functions with new transit infrastructure and policy. As traffic 
demand increases, new strategies surface, such as increased public transit user or higher 
fees for parking. Incentives for alternatives to transportation have been found in cities 
like Seoul, South Korea. The demolition of the Cheonnggyecheon Expressway now 
includes new bus rapid transit. Seattle has plans to add new light rail when the Alaskan 
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Way Viaduct is replaced with a tunnel or removed all together. These improvements not 
only encourage shifts in modes of transportation but also set the stage for reducing carbon 
emissions. Awareness continues to be raised not just of the negative environmental 
impacts brought on by urban freeways, but also of the social repercussions cities face. 
Lost urban connectivity can be reversed. New connections can be made. 
Design and development strategies undertaken by cities depend on geographical 
context, transportation needs, societal goals, and available resources, among other 
factors. Via massive community support, many cities have fought the political system to 
gain the funding needed to re-design their downtown highway corridors. Nonetheless, 
costs only continue to rise from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. Cities can 
expect material and labor costs to inflate because the time needed to complete projects of 
monumental scales always takes longer than predicted, often spanning multiple years.  
  New York City, for example, had over one billion dollars in federal funds available 
to create a five-mile urban boulevard. The boulevard is abundantly landscaped and 
includes a bicycle greenway. In contrast, the Amsterdam suburb Zaanstadt took a more 
modest approach. It chose to live with an elevated highway by improving the space 
underneath with a grocery and recreation. Though these solutions have different scales 
and costs, both became equally significant public gathering spaces. 
Transportation solutions should focus on urban form and quality of life. 
Understanding freeway impacts on the social and physical level of cities is still 
subjective. However, what remains certain is an urban freeway’s ability to become a 
barrier. Barriers shape cities, such as a river or an old city wall. When they become social 
barriers to the citizens and the economy, a way around or through them is found. 
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Suburban sprawl is one reaction. Highway changes are naturally the next step to this 
process, followed by the freedom after removal. These decisions are conventionally 
measured against road capacity and travel time. However, ambitious cities like San 
Francisco, California and Portland, Oregon have viewed the urban freeway from a 
different perspective. They have set goals for waterfront access, public space, 
sustainability, and room for economic development in parallel with traffic planning, not 
separated from it.  
 Transportation infrastructure offers extraordinary opportunities for design, 
creativity, and connectivity. Highway reconfiguration provides rare opportunities for 
cities to strengthen separated neighborhoods or abandoned waterfronts. At the same time, 
some cities have learned that they need not always turn their backs to infrastructure. Its 
purposes are not just for transporting goods and commuters. Cities are transforming both 
de-commissioned and active infrastructure into new civic landmarks and unexpected 
spaces for urban activity. Louisville, Kentucky has built safe park space below its 
riverfront, elevated highway. Both Paris and New York have re-imagined elevated 
railroads as linear parks. The design of the High Line in New York integrates landscape 
with an iconic industrial-era elevated structure. The Viaducs des Arts near the Seine 
River changed its face to a Promenade Plantée with retail space below. 
 Public investment in highway reconfiguration and removal creates benefits – from 
development parcels to increased property values to improved quality of life. The public 
sector must act strategically in order to capture this value. Selling parcels of the freed real 
estate to the private sector for mixed-use development can spur funding for these 
projects. Highway removal will also enhance the value of neighboring property to 
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increase investment. Conversely, opportunity costs accumulate when decision-making 
processes drag on. Private investors battling with the public sector for land acquisition 
remains a problem for so many cities. 
 Projects of this magnitude require vision and active commitment at the highest 
levels of leadership from the city government to the federal decision makers. Moreover, 
the full range of stakeholder input, from support to opposition, must be understood and 
responded to at a rational and fundamental standard. Visionary leadership must include 
an informed and engaged public that has an active role in developing design solutions. 
City leaders need to support and advocate for integrated approaches to infrastructure 
design. Their decisions must embrace all aspects to urban design and policy—proposing 
the sidewalk, planning the street, encompassing the block, complementing the 
neighborhood, and considering the undivided city. Public space, transportation, and 
economic development opportunities are not separate.  
The current highway planning process is a well-intentioned effort aiming to 
ensure that the mistakes of the Interstate-building era will never be repeated [10]. But this 
is not enough. Highway planning must be considered as one part – and not the most 
important – of the process of building sustainable cities. No two cities are alike. 
Designing a uniform highway system created a “copy and paste” technique that now 
exists in multiple cities. Transportation systems must adapt to each city individually, 
better integrating land use, urban form, and its surrounding geographical framework.  
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GARDINER  EXPRESSWAY,  ($758  million)
Toronto,  Ontario,  1.5  miles
RIVERFRONT  PARKWAY,  $140  million
Chattanooga,  TN,  1.7  miles
VIADUC  DES  ARTS,  $25  million
Paris,  France,  1.25  miles
*  EMBARCADERO  FREEWAY,  $210  million
San  Francisco,  CA,  1.6  miles
BUFFALO  SKYWAY,  ($124  million)
Buffalo,  NY,  1  mile
BONAVENTURE  EXPRESSWAY,  ($90  million)
Montreal,  Quebec,  0.6  miles
A8ERN8,  $3  million
Zaanstadt,  The  Netherlands,  0.25  miles
0 0.25 0.5  mile
0 0.5  km
*  FREEWAY  PARK,  $24  million
Seattle,  Washington,  0.2  miles
RIVERWALK,  $150  million
Trenton,  NJ,  0.45  miles
*  CENTRAL  FREEWAY,  $50.3  million
San  Francisco,  CA,  0.9  miles
*  PARK  EAST  FREEWAY,  $80  million
Milwaukee,  WI,  1.25  miles
*  THE  HIGHLINE,  ($60+  million)
Manhattan,  NY,  1.3  miles
*  LAKE  PLACE,  $200  million
Duluth,  MN,  1.3  miles
THE  CONNECTOR  AT  MIDTOWN
Atlanta,  GA,  1.5  miles
*  RIVERPLACE,  $150  million
Portland,  OR,  1.7  miles
*  SELECTED  CASE  STUDIES
APPENDIX A 




















ADDITIONAL PROJECT IMAGES AND PLANS 
 
 
Figure B.1: The Federal Highway Administration breaks ground [12] 
 
Figure B.2: Proposed design of Boston’s Central Artery, 1925 [15] 
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Figure B.3: Boston’s Central Artery near the central business district, 1989 [20] 
 
Figure B.4: Nighttime view of Boston’s New Greenway,  






Figure B.5 and B.6: Boston’s The Central Artery, 1989 [20]  





















Figure B.11: A View Towards the Hudson River, 1974 [24] 
 
 















































Figure B.13: Proposed Freeway Plan of San Francisco, 1948 [29] 
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Figure B.13: Embarcadero Freeway Map, 1972 [27] 
 






































Figure B.23: Imagery of the Embarcadero Freeway, 1987 [19] 
 
 


















Figure C.3: Building a segment of the downtown highways, 1958 [32] 
 
 








































DESIGN ANALYSES OF THE DOWNTOWN CONNECTOR 
 
 
Figure D.1: Base map of Atlanta’s highways, highlighting the Downtown Connector 
The zoomed area includes the entire stretch of the Downtown Connector I-75/85. 
For feasibility of any strategy to change the face of this highway, the 7.5-mile length is 
divided in four segments from north to south: Brookwood interchange joining I-75 and   
I-85 at the north of the Midtown section, Grady Curve through Downtown, Summerhill 
cutting across Atlanta’s oldest neighborhoods and passing Turner Field, and Lakewood 




Figure D.1.1: Satellite imagery of the Downtown Connector, Lakewood segment [19] 
1” = 1200’ 
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 Figure D.1.2: Satellite imagery of the Downtown Connector, Summerhill segment [19]  
1” = 1200’ 
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Figure D.1.3: Satellite imagery of the Downtown Connector, Grady Curve segment [19] 
1” = 1200’ 
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Figure D.1.4: Satellite imagery of the Downtown Connector, Midtown segment [19] 




Figure D.2.1: Existing Plan of the Midtown Segment 
!"#"$%
&'((")*'+ ,*+"" *
-+*" +./ ( , *+"" *














































































% - # ' + ) 2 (
! ' # ( ( '
/ 3 ' + ! '
4 ' +
% 5 (
6 5 7 - # , + . 8
1” = 1200’ 






Figure D.2.2: Area at the Brookwood Split [19] 
1” = 300’ 
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Figure D.2.3: Existing Section of the Midtown Segment 















































Figure D.2.5: Existing Section at 10th Street 
 











   
Figure D.3.1 and D.3.2: Sections of the Burying strategy and the Bridging Strategy 
D.3 Design Strategies 
NTS 
To bury the Midtown 
Segment of the Connector, the 
change in existing grade will 
require smoothing. Essentially 
a vast, single cap will be 
placed along the segment. 
Covered starting at 17th Street, 
the Connector cannot travel 
below existing grade until 14th 
Street because of the elevation 
of the Brookwood Split. 
Burying this interchange is 
not shown.  
 
The plan for bridging 
will not change the grade of 
the highway. Existing bridges 
at 14th, 10th, 5th, and North 
Avenue are at the same 
elevation as the environs 
neighboring. These four caps 
can be widened but not 
connect with each other 
because of undulations in the 
highway. 
 
          For burying or bridging, 
the road capacity is 
untouched, except during 
times of construction, which 
may prove to be too severe. 
Refer to the chart and the end 
of this appendix for estimated 
costs of each strategy. 
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Figure D.3.3 and D.3.4: Renderings of the Burying strategy and the Bridging strategy 
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Figure D.3.5: Section of the Taming strategy 
1” = 1200’ 
This strategy can succeed only if the design 
incorporates all parts that make up the urban 
environment. In other words, the private vehicle is 
not the first priority. The taming design reduces road 
capacity by removing the 14-lane highway and 
replacing it with a 6-lane boulevard. For excess 
width, transit, parking, wide sidewalks, and green 
space can easily add span to the corridor. 
 
The Brookwood interchange requires a 
transition of roadway traversing between the existing 
two highways to the north toward their join to 
become a boulevard. The existing design can be 
modified rather than completely resurfacing the 
intersection. Additionally, accessible park space can 
be added to ameliorate the interchange.  
 
The boulevard is bounded by the intersection 
with the new 17th Street because its bridge must be 
removed as it is above grade. All other existing 
bridges in this segment are at grade and can remain. 
Areas of the highway below grade can be filled in to 
meet with the neighboring parts of the city. While 
filling in, space can be left for any future 
underground transit.  
 
The possibilities are endless with the freeing 
of the Connector’s corridor. Old and new 
connections in Atlanta’s urban form can be created. 
Blighted areas can be accessible for new 
development. There would be ample space for 
transit, bike paths, and nature. 
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Figure D.3.6 and D.3.7: Diagrams of the Taming strategy, increasing connectivity  
1” = 1200’ 
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Figure D.3.8: Diagram of the Ameliorating strategy 
1” = 1200’ 
Retaining and ameliorating Midtown’s 
highway segment can include a number of 
design proposals. It may take strategies from 
any typology to change the face of the highway 
with the exception of reducing road capacity 
by more than 25% percent. Options considered 
in this diagram focus on minimizing cost and 
do not show any additional caps over the 
highway. Notwithstanding, limiting view of the 
eyesore requires massive greening methods. 
An urban forest and park can inhabit the land 
surrounding the Brookwood interchange. The 
example set by the 5th Street bridge to add 
greenspace and sculpt a unique wall design can 
be mimicked by the other four existing bridges.  
 
Spaces along the edges of the highway 
and the medians themselves would become a 
greenway of trees and trails. These edges could 
be much wider than the existing, seeing as at 
least half of the highway access roads and 
ramps would be repurposed, limiting entry to 
the Connector. These parallel corridors may be 
part of the new park system. They might also 
become a part of the network of city streets. 
Specifically, the southbound, one-way off 
ramp along the western edge could easily be 
less expansive in width and length. With the 
highway-access roads being blocks shorter, a 
two-way street can replace some sections and 
can add entry to existing collector streets that 
currently end once they reach the edge of the 
ramps or freeway walls.  
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Cost Estimates for the Midtown Segment [34] 
 
 Miles = 1.5 
 Lanes = 14 
STRATEGY INITIAL COST ANNUAL COST 
RETAIN 0 $7 million 
BRIDGE $600 - $900 million $20 - $25 million 
TAME (6-lane) $100 - $200 million $5- $10 million 
AMELIORATE $10 - $150 million $10 - $20 million 
DEMOLISH $10 - $20 million 0 
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